Parallelcoin is one of the many forks of Bitcoin, which appeared around the same time as the first ASIC SHA256d miner was released. It's creator was only active for a very short time, released a coin, and a community sprung up around it.
Eventually its most avid fans formed a Community Takeover group, led by @marcetin at Bitcointalk, and eventually they found Loki, who was able to fork (btcd)[https://github.com/btcsuite/btcd] into a working client and with (btcwallet)[https://github.com/btcsuite/btcwallet] providing the base for a wallet, and then set about upgrading the protocol and proof of work.
This white paper is being written in the last stage of development preparing for the beta test, at first none of us really knew exactly what we were doing, but as it developed some specific ideas about what should be now and what we are doing next have emerged alongside the development of the (gio)[https://gioui.org] immediate mode (functional pattern) GUI which is just emerging to a useful state right now as we deploy it.
The current work started out first with creating a new, 9 algorithm difficulty adjustment regime, initially using numerous several very memory hard hash functions. Then a proof of work based on very large integer long division was added.
The previously regular clock, single reward schedule loosely based on ideas from Monero and the Gravity Wave series of difficulty adjustment systems, both parallel and with a single block clock aiming to distribute versions evenly, was replaced with a 9 block versions in full free parallel with each block version having a different interval target, each of them based on a simple algorithm to select a series of primes being the number of seconds of the interval, multiplied by 3.
Thus the new chain now one can mine blocks that have dramatically (over 20x) difference between the shortest interval (9 seconds) and the longest (which happens to be 249 seconds). The reward for each block in each parallel interval version is scaled proportionally with the frequency they are intended to be found, the idea here is that the miner configuration will be possible to set an arbitrary subset of the full 9 for specific reasons. Smaller miners tend to have problems with payment regularity, so they can mine shorter blocks, meaning more regular payments.
Pool mining will be possible if someone writes a pool miner that works with the protocol, however because of the very tight interval of the low end, they and large cluster miner operators can prefer to mine longer interval blocks because they have better capitalization and less pressing need of cash flow as they have a surplus to work from.
From a security perspective, the use of a CPU focused (only CPUs have large 64 bit long division units) mining algorithm and having these several parallel block interval/reward schedules, the cost of disrupting the chain is contained by the economics of acquiring the amount of long division computation capability as everyone else, there is no shortcut to building a Plan 9 hard fork capable miner, it's just a bare PC, anything with the most basic graphics output, running whatever OS is preferred by the operator. There won't be anyone making more silicon with long division units than is already being made so a strong pressure against rapid network scaling leading to rapidly changing profitability, a killer of small miners, will be a weaker issue and thus the distribution of mining power will be significantly wider than any existing mining network.
The supply of tokens will be capped at 9% additional per year starting from the total supply of the pre-hardfork chain. Future plans of the niche the token will hold involve inter-chain communication protocols and the Cosmos Internet of Blockchains, and these proof of stake systems require some kind of bonding security - this will be a primary use case that the current soon to be upgraded Nakamoto Consensus based Bitcoin fork chain. Though its' transaction clearance rate is fast, it is not point of sale fast and other technologies are required to allow such processing.
The strong probabilistic finality of the Nakamoto Consensus makes it harder to alter the record and on this chain's schedule the record is effectively permanent typically after a minute. Thus it is a good platform for enforcing security and disbursements and penalties on those holding positions of public trust as members of the validator set in these faster, but less distributed and weaker liveness of sidechains built for other specific purposes with a consortium/commercial focus.
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Hard fork with CPU mining
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Simple autoconfiguring mining protocol for farms and multiple worker setups
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Remote control and telemetry, self-upgrading platform for easy administration
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Pixel perfect, smooth user interface system for desktop users
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Build Android and iOS builds of GUI
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Upgrade all cryptosystems to Schnorr and Blake algorithms
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Snapshot and distribute authenticated bulk raw database of old chain instead of replay - adding an IPFS namespace and network for relevant data
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Build a full one-shot build-everything tooling system to enable one codebase to produce a GUI app that can be run on all major desktop and mobile operating systems.
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Based on the principles of the Plan 9 P9 network addressing system, create a framework to allow creating an entire ecosystem and eventually application library that can add any application running alongside the wallet and extend the concept of wallet to a digital identity standing shoulder to shoulder with user configuration at the centre of operating system state.
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Integrate Cosmos Inter Blockchain Communication (IBC) protocol into consensus (this and the cryptosystems require a hard fork again) so that DUO can implement and enforce threshold voting systems to enable specific operations with Validator Security Deposit Bonds. These wrap and unwind deposit contracts with a democratic process to enforce penalties for misbehavior, the market valuation of these bonds as a secondary feature (and enabling delegation of funding sources for bonded funds). The idea is to create secondary chains that link to the core and to other chains using IBC for specific use cases. The possibilities for this are literally unlimited but depend on a trustworthy system of delegation to scale.
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Build a small but useful collection of pre-built and configured, as open-as-possible hardware and software base to create a shell and ultimately full operating system core. Something based on SailfishOS is the most likely basis for initial efforts, but instead running compiled GO code that the user can easily access. This will link to a versioning/project/social network IBC sidechain system for sharing public, open source projects directly from within the system itself. There will be file manager, code editor, all hackable and pluggable and connected to a window manager system/interface. We want to obsolete Github, yesterday, but keep all our issues and gists and projects, and add a forum tree and private messaging system.
The emergence of ubiquitous networking and sensor and data sharing systems means in the modern world, your digital identity is both powerfully connected but extremely vulnerable to mischief. The crucial vulnerability in all cases of data security incidents always comes back to centralisation of access and power to change it. The Bitcoin cryptocurrency appeared as an early and watershed moment for the downward spiral towards totalitarianism that was occurring in computer science.
The core goal of distributed, decentralised cryptocurrency networks is eliminating the possibility of large single players from controlling enough stake to pump and dump their competitors out of business. To make running such distributed services profitable enough and accessible to a wide range of budgets and helping ensure that one participant can have a shortcut-created outsized influence. Whether that is simply even the ability to pay and be paid cryptocurrency, or the ability to send a message securely to another person with minimal risk of interception, the individual's capacity to protect and from the basis of consensus factual data about control of assets, reduce the problem of electronic crime and its costs.
Thus, it is elementary to say that the only way to make a fair system is to make it so that it does not have big levers that wave godlike power around without extreme luck, but rather by cheating, lying and stealing. There ideally should be no 'public goods' to be controlled in common without a strict, transparent system of accounting, as such goods are often essentially tools of power, the power of a mob. The electronic networks make it possible to communicate the information at such a rate that the system has to have security against any use of the information that gives an unfair advantage to some members of the system against others. So first the security of the security is important.
For this, we build the chain so it becomes very distributed with a very large number of miners and a shallow curve to the distribution.
Next we need to connect the core chain up to services in such a way that the core token is a bulk payment and security deposit instrument, and secondary systems form the basis of pegged and collectively issued (eg stocks) tokens. The tokenisation is the liberation of financial derivatives entirely from regulation. It might be possible to 'ban' some particular network and token but ultimately such a ban cannot be enforced. By opening up financial services to smaller operators, within a tightly secured system, we eliminate the bigger shocks caused by allowing services to be provided more redundantly and with equally good odds of success.
To replace all the currently centralised services, social networks, data sharing systems, marketplaces, with decentralised versions, requires a strong base. There is no doubt that Nakamoto Consensus is the best choice for its long term immutability, so it is the basis of the core of the system. From there, it is just a matter of, ultimately, extending chain consensus to include other chains, which can then reinforce each other through their mutual relations. By putting a big stake on good behaviour and popularity as a network service provider, we create competition to be better at this service, for the reason that such systems eliminate the friction and losses caused by exploitation of the centralised systems by small groups.